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Maintaining Order in the Post-Strike
Workplace: Employee Expression
and the Scope of Section 7
Lyrissa C. Barnettt
In the aftermath of a typical strike, management often seeks to restore
order to the workplace by imposing restrictions on employee expression.
Although in principle employee expression is protected by section 7 of the
National Labor Relations Act, courts, relying on outdated notions of work-
place organization, often accept ad hoc management justifications for re-
strictions on employee expression. The author argues that after a strike, it
is crucial for employees to be able to express their grievances or vent their
frustrations at exactly the same time that employers feel it necessary to
restrict expression as a way of re-imposing order in the workplace. She
proposes that courts require a heightened showing of threats to workplace
discipline before accepting the kinds of justifications traditionally accepted
by courts in permitting employers to limit the rights of their employees.
Courts can do this, she maintains, by recognizing and incorporating com-
peting theories of workplace organization. Acceptance of competing orga-
nizational paradigms would increase their sensitivity to the nuances of
employee rights under section 7 and eventually result in increased protec-
tion of employee rights consonant with section 7's guarantees.
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Strikes are industrial warfare.' In a typical strike, management and
labor become locked in a battle of wills, with each side deploying eco-
nomic, political, and psychological weapons against the other. In addition
to traditional picketing, a striking union may wage a multi-dimensional cor-
porate campaign to bring public censure to bear upon the company and to
disrupt its relations with other companies.2 The employer often counteracts
the union's tactics with its own campaign to capture public opinion. And in
an economic strike, the employer may further respond by permanently re-
placing its striking workers.' Thus, for striking employees, a strike is both
a threat to their economic well-being and a symbol that their employer does
not value their contribution to the workplace. Not surprisingly, emotions
run high. Striking employees may direct their anger and frustration toward
"scabs" (both crossover employees and permanent replacements), toward
management, and toward anyone else connected with the company.4 In this
tense environment, strikers often exchange insults and profanity with re-
placement workers and supervisors. In extreme instances, threats and vio-
lence may ensue.
Hostilities do not necessarily end, however, when the strike is over.
Lingering post-strike hostilities can create dissension and disharmony in the
workplace, impairing discipline and, ultimately, production. The aftermath
of the 1987-88 strike against International Paper (IP) in Jay, Maine, aptly
demonstrates this problem. The IP strike was protracted and bitter, a bitter-
ness exacerbated by IP's permanently replacing the striking employees. 5
As Professors Jack Getman and Ray Marshall indicate in their recent study
I. United Auto Workers strikers at Caterpillar's plant in Peoria, Illinois made this point explicit
by posting a large sign near a heavily traveled bridge that crosses the Illinois River. The sign read: "You
are entering a war zone: Caterpillar versus its UAW employees." Stephen Franklin, No Peace, No
Contract a Year After Caterpillar Standoff, CHI. TRIB., Apr. 12, 1993, at 1, 1 ("Neither side seems to be
winning this war. Nor is either willing to back down.").
2. The union's tactics "may include consumer boycotts, political lobbying, pressuring sharehold-
ers, and targeting financial institutions doing business with the employer." Melinda J. Branscomb, La-
bor, Loyalty, and the Corporate Campaign, 73 B.U. L. REV. 291, 293 n.4 (citation omitted) (comparing
the corporate campaign to "verbal warfare"). See Julius G. Getman & F. Ray Marshall, Industrial
Relations in Transition: The Paper Industry Erample, 102 YALE L.J. 1803, 1831 (1993) ("A corporate
campaign generally involves actions against employers such as slowdowns, negative publicity, demon-
strations, and efforts to disrupt the company's executive structure and its relationships with other
employers.").
3. The Supreme Court recognized the right of employers to permanently replace economic strik-
ers in NLRB v. Mackay Radio & Tel. Co., 304 U.S. 333 (1938).
4. Getman & Marshall, supra note 2, at 1838.
5. Id.
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of the IP strike, no matter which side wins the strike, workplace harmony
may be destroyed: the IP strike "shattered the lives of employees, divided
the community, and left a mill that was once a cooperative enterprise di-
vided into warring, mutually suspicious factions."6 Rehired workers re-
turned to IP "openly contemptuous of the replacements and hostile to
supervisors."7 As one returning striker stated, "just because I've got my job
doesn't mean it's over. I've still got 600-800 friends on the outside and
until they're back, I refuse to socialize with these people." 8 Replacement
workers, too, felt negatively toward IP because of the strife in the work-
place.9 Predictably, this post-strike friction at IP led to a decline in produc-
tion, profits, and quality.1" Although returning employees worked hard, the
formerly cooperative work environment at IP was tainted. The former
strikers "refused to give the company the benefit of their experience and
know-how." 1 The IP example thus illustrates that post-strike hostilities
can have a lingering detrimental effect on the workplace.
In light of this danger, the employer has a strong interest in maintain-
ing order and control in the workplace and in restoring a cooperative work
environment. To advance this interest, employers often seek to impose re-
strictions on potentially inflammatory employee expression, whether that
expression takes the form of union insignia, messages on t-shirts, or actual
speech.' 2 In addition, employers may even seek to discipline or discharge
employees on the basis of post-strike expressive activity;" in essence, the
6. Id. at 109. The aftermath of the UAW-Caterpillar strike also confirms this assessment:
The dispute's lingering effects-the bruised feelings, the corrosive uncertainty about the fu-
ture, the shunning campaign by the union toward the 976 workers who crossed its lines, the
grudging tit-for-tat war between Caterpillar and UAW-mount daily. Neither side seems to
be winning this war. Nor is either willing to back down.
Stephen Franklin, No Peace, No Contract a Year After Caterpillar Standoff, CHI. TRIB., Apr. 12, 1993,
at 1, 1.
7. Getman & Marshall, supra note 2, at 1836.
8. Id.
9. Id. at 1841.
10. See generally id.
11. Id. at 1840.
12. See, e.g., Boeing Airplane Co. v. NLRB, 217 F.2d 369 (9th Cir. 1954) (employer adopted
rules prohibiting employees from wearing steward and committee buttons, from displaying loyalty
streamers, and from discussing union affairs on company property, in order to prevent violent actions in
breach of peace); United Aircraft Corp., 134 N.L.R.B. 1632 (1961) (supervisors instructed to ask em-
ployees to remove union loyalty pins to promote post-strike harmony); Boise Cascade Corp., 300
N.L.R.B. 80 (1990) (post-strike employer unsuccessfully attempted to ban labor-related pins, t-shirts and
stickers).
13. See, e.g., Manchester Health Ctr. v. NLRB, 861 F.2d 50 (2d Cir. 1988) (holding that restrict-
ing rights of medical care provider employees to discuss union activities is justified in order to heal post-
strike wounds; termination for repeated violation of ban is proper if employee received adequate warn-
ings); Midstate Tel. Corp. v. NLRB, 706 F.2d 401 (2d Cir. 1983) (finding that employee right to display
union-related messages must be balanced against right of employers to maintain discipline in their estab-
lishments; company did not violate NLRA by banning t-shirts and not paying t-shirt-wearing employees
for the time it took them to procure a change of clothing).
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employer seeks to regulate both the tone and the content of employee ex-
pression to restore order to the post-strike workplace.
The employer's interest in such restrictions, however, collides with the
employees' interests in expressing their solidarity with other workers and in
venting their grievances about their employer, interests that may be height-
ened in the wake of an emotional strike.1 4
Section 7 of the National Labor Relations Act ("NLRA") 5 provides
that employees have a right to engage in "concerted activities for the pur-
pose of ... mutual aid or protection ...."6 In principle, section 7 entails
the right of employees to wear union insignia' 7 and to discuss workplace
issues and grievances.' Yet the scope of these section 7 rights is not un-
limited, and the National Labor Relations Board ("Board") and the courts
have carved from it a number of "special exceptions." For example, courts
sometimes have allowed employers to restrict employee expression ordina-
rily protected under section 7, on the ground that such restrictions are nec-
essary to maintain efficiency and production or to maintain discipline."
Hence, section 7 doctrine creates a tension between employer and employee
interests in the post-strike period: while the employer seeks to reassert order
and efficiency by imposing restrictions on employee expression, the em-
ployees have a heightened need to engage in such expression at precisely
the same time.
The case law interpreting section 7 fails to resolve this tension. The
Board and the courts have charted no clear course for dealing with em-
ployer restrictions on employee expression in the post-strike workplace.
Some tribunals have accepted employers' assertions that such restrictions
are necessary to maintain discipline, efficiency and production.2 ° Other
tribunals, however, more solicitous of the section 7 rights of employees,
have rejected such justifications.2' The question then becomes, What bal-
14. Getman and Marshall note that the anger and resentment felt by returning strikers and supervi-
sors after the IP strike might have been defused "if the strikers and supervisors had a chance to meet and
express their anger and discuss their feelings with each other." Getman & Marshall, supra note 2, at
1839 n.119.
15. 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 151-169 (West 1973 & Supp. 1993).
16. 29 U.S.C.A. § 157.
17. Republic Aviation Corp. v. NLRB, 324 U.S. 793, 795-96, 803 (1945).
18. See, e.g., Eastex, Inc. v. NLRB, 437 U.S. 556, 563-68 (1978).
19. Employers also have asserted that employee expression, particularly in the form of union
insignia, may be restricted because it harms customer relations or because it constitutes a safety hazard.
See John W. Teeter, Jr., Banning the Buttons: Employer Interference with the Right to Wear Union
Insignia in the Workplace, 80 Ky. L.J. 377, 378 (1991-92) (discussing various employer justifications
for banning union insignia). Because these justifications do not carry any unique force in the post-strike
context, they are beyond the scope of this paper.
20. Boeing Airplane Co. v. NLRB, 217 F.2d 369 (9th Cir. 1954); Midstate Tel. Corp v. NLRB,
706 F.2d 401 (2d Cir. 1983); Reynolds Elec. & Eng'g Co., 292 N.L.R.B. 947 (1989).
21. Boise Cascade, 300 N.L.R.B. 80 (1990); Midstate Tel. Corp., 262 N.L.R.B. 1291 (1982),
enforcement denied in relevant part, 706 F.2d 401 (2d Cir. 1983); Boeing Airplane Co., 103 N.L.R.B.
1025 (1953), enforcement denied in relevant part, 217 F.2d 369 (9th Cir. 1954).
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ance should be struck between the employer's need to maintain order in the
post-strike workplace and the employees' right to engage in expression pro-
tected by section 7?
In this article, I argue that the balance generally should be struck in
favor of more, not less, employee expression. Part 11 explores the scope of
section 7 and details the dangers of allowing the "special circumstances"
exception to section 7 to eviscerate its protection of employee expression.
Part III then analyzes competing values in the post-strike context and com-
peting paradigms of workplace organization, and, based on this analysis,
argues that appellate courts have adopted a paradigm of workplace relations
that predisposes them to privilege employer control of the workplace at the
expense of employee expression rights. Finally, Part IV proposes an alter-
native approach to restoring order to the workplace, one which accommo-
dates both employer interests in maintaining order and employee interests
in expression.
II
ExCEvrIONS AND THE RULE: REPUBLIC A VIATION AND ITS
PROGENY
As the Supreme Court explicitly has recognized, section 7 protects the
rights of employees to express themselves regarding workplace issues.22
Such expression may take the form of speech, leafletting, or the wearing of
union insignia or t-shirts. Section 7 protection of employee expression is
not without limits, however. The Supreme Court's Republic opinion also
recognized that "special circumstances" might justify employer restrictions
on these rights: the employees' "undisputed right of self-organization" must
be balanced against the "equally undisputed right of employers to maintain
discipline in their establishments."23 This supposedly narrow "special cir-
cumstances" exception has seriously eroded section 7's protection of em-
ployee expression in-the post-strike context. In fact, a survey of pertinent
case law reveals that the National Labor Relations Board and the federal
courts often unquestioningly accept ad hoc employer determinations that
restrictions on employee expression are necessary to maintain production or
discipline in the post-strike context.
A. Section 7 and Employee Expression
Consider the following scenario: An employer and a union become
embroiled in a bitter strike over wages and seniority. The employer perma-
22. Republic Aviation Corp. v. NLRB, 324 U.S. 793 (1945) (holding that section 7 protects both
union solicitation during non-work time and in non-work areas, and the wearing of union insignia at
work); Eastex, Inc. v. NLRB, 437 U.S. 556, 564 (1977) (holding that section 7 protects speech related to
terms and conditions of employment as well as speech "in support of employees of employers other than
their own").
23. Republic Aviation, 324 U.S. at 797-98.
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nently replaces many of the striking employees. Strikers, permanent
replacements, and supervisors trade insults and profanity daily on the picket
line. Several unidentified strikers throw rocks and bottles at permanent
replacements as they enter the plant. When the striking employees finally
return to work, they are belligerent and angry. The atmosphere in the work-
place is tense and unfriendly. To restore peace to this volatile environment,
the employer promulgates two rules: one forbids any discussion of union
matters on its premises; the other forbids the wearing of union insignia or t-
shirts.24 Do such restrictions interfere with employee expression protected
under section 7 of the NLRA?
In principle, section 7 protects employee expression of the sort that is
common after a strike, i.e., expression concerning workplace issues and
grievances, particularly expression calculated to enhance union solidarity.25
Section 7 guarantees private-sector employees the "right to self-organize
... and to engage in other concerted activities. . . for mutual aid or protec-
tion"2 6 and proscribes employer interference with, or discrimination based
on, the exercise of such employee rights.27 As interpreted by the Supreme
Court in Republic Aviation, employees' rights of self-organization and asso-
ciation encompass the right to wear union insignia and apparel and to en-
gage in union solicitation on an employer's premises during non-work
hours.28 Specifically, the Court in Republic Aviation held that an em-
ployer's broad rules against solicitation and its prohibitions against wearing
union insignia interfered with the "right of employes [sic] to organize for
mutual aid"29 and thus constituted unfair labor practices.3
Although protecting employee expression, however, the Republic Avi-
ation Court also indicated that an employer might restrict otherwise pro-
tected expression upon a showing of "special circumstances [that] make
the rule necessary in order to maintain production or discipline."3 The
Court framed the question as one of "working out an adjustment between
24. The facts of this hypothetical derive from several cases. See, e.g., Boeing Airplane Co. v.
NLRB, 217 F.2d 369, 376-77 (9th Cir. 1954) (employer sought to restrict the wearing of union insignia
and discussion on union matters following a six-month strike); Midstate Tel. Corp. v. NLRB, 706 F.2d
401, 402-03 (2d Cir. 1983) (employer sought to prohibit the wearing of union t-shirts).
25. Employee expression regarding "terms and conditions of employment" clearly is protected
under section 7. See Eastex, Inc. v. NLRB, 437 U.S. 556, 565 (1978).
26. 29 U.S.C.A. § 157.
27. 29 U.S.C.A. § 158.
28. Republic Aviation, 324 U.S. at 795-96, 803.
29. Id. at 798.
30. First, the Court found that the employer's broad anti-solicitation rule violated section 8(1).
The Court next determined that the rule interfered with the employees' associational rights under section
7 because it prohibited such solicitation even during non-work time. The Court also found that the
employer's prohibition of union insignia violated section 8(l) because it interfered with section 7 rights.
Finally, the Court reasoned that by discharging an employee on the basis of this rule, the employer also
violated section 8(3). Id. at 795-97.
31. Republic Aviation, 324 U.S. at 803-04 n.10 (quoting Peyton Packing Co., 49 N.L.R.B. 828,
843-44 (1943)).
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the undisputed right of self-organization assured to employees ... and the
equally undisputed right of employers to maintain discipline in their estab-
lishments."32 The Court summarized its position by stating that both the
"[o]pportunity to organize" and "proper discipline" are vital in a "balanced
society,"" implying that an employer's right to manage his or her property
might sometimes trump employees' expression rights.
B. Post-Strike Special Circumstances
Republic Aviation's special circumstances exception has become a po-
tent weapon in the hands of employers seeking to justify suppressing em-
ployee expression in the post-strike period. Specifically, employers have
argued (often with little empirical foundation) that wearing union insignia
or apparel, or discussing union matters, promotes dissension and dishar-
mony in the workplace, thereby threatening production and discipline.34
The appellate courts have been especially receptive to such arguments, even
in the face of a Board finding of an unfair labor practice. Although the
Board itself generally has been more protective of employee expression, it
too sometimes has accepted employer justifications that rest on dubious
premises about the dangers of employee expression.
1. The Courts
Boeing Airplane Co. v. NLRB35 illustrates the appellate courts' willing-
ness to denigrate the importance of employees' section 7 rights in the name
of maintaining post-strike workplace discipline. The employer in Boeing
sought to restrict both wearing union insignia and speaking about union
matters following a six-month strike.3 6 After the striking employees re-
turned to work, the union found itself in the middle of a "vigorous organiz-
ing campaign," 37 competing for employee allegiance with a rival union.
The original union alleged that the employer unlawfully supported the ri-
val. 38 Although the Board found that the employer's rule was unnecessary
to maintain discipline in the workplace,39 the Ninth Circuit rejected its find-
32. Id. at 797-98.
33. Id. at 798.
34. See, e.g., Boeing Airplane Co. v. NLRB, 217 F.2d 369 (9th Cir. 1954).
35. 217 F.2d 369 (9th Cir. 1954).
36. Id. at 373, 375-76.
37. Id. at 371.
38. Id. at 371-72, 377. Employer support of a rival union violates 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(2), which
makes it unlawful for an employer "to dominate or interfere with the formation or administration of any
labor organization or contribute financial or other support to it." Id. In this instance, however, the Ninth
Circuit found that the employer had "favored," but had not "dominated" the rival union. Boeing, 217
F.2d at 377.
39. Boeing Airplane Co., 103 N.L.R.B. 1025, 1026 (1953), enforcement denied in relevant part,
217 F.2d 369 (9th Cir. 1954).
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ings, stating that the employer's justification for imposing the rule, namely
"keeping of peace between rival unions," was "important."'
The Ninth Circuit's rhetoric in Boeing reflects that court's weak com-
mitment to protecting employee expression. According to the court's char-
acterization, the union was "flaun[ting]" its union insignia."' Moreover,
the court stated, given the "extremely inflammable ... passions of the rival
unions," the prohibited union insignia could be the "spark which might in a
second set everything afire again."4 The court even went so far as to laud
the employer's suppression of employee expression in the post-strike pe-
riod, stating that "[i]f there were a rule ... that union business should not
for the time being be discussed upon company premises, it would not be a
violation of the Act but a salutary precaution."43 Leaving no doubt where
its sympathies lay, the court marvelled at how "remarkable" it was that
"Boeing was able to keep the great organization from any more acts which
the Board would construe as violations." 44
Boeing reveals how unstable is the ground upon which employee ex-
pression rights rest. Based upon the employer's bald, unsubstantiated asser-
tion that union insignia might incite violence in the aftermath of a violent
strike (an assertion undermined by the court's own recognition that labor
peace had reigned for years at Boeing),45 the Ninth Circuit was willing to
sacrifice employee expression of union solidarity even though the union
was in the midst of a heated organizing campaign. The union insignia at
issue-buttons and streamers indicating union membership-were not in-
flammatory in and of themselves, and the employer produced no evidence
of violence between the rival unions. Not only was the court's characteriza-
tion of the union insignia as "incitements to crime or violent action" 46 trans-
parently false; the court also ignored the possibility that the employer's
rules might have been motivated by ill will toward the union that had just
returned from a bitter and costly strike. But perhaps the most disturbing
element of the Boeing opinion is its assumption about worker behavior: the
employer is justified in restricting employee expression in the post-strike
period because employees automatically will respond violently to the slight-
est provocation.
40. Boeing, 217 F.2d at 374-75. Further, the Ninth Circuit disagreed with the Board's conclusion
that the company had adopted any rule prohibiting various forms of expression. Id.
41. Id. at 374. The court also quoted with favor the Trial Examiner's report that the employer's
rule forbidding discussion of union matters on its premises was "reasonably related to the Respondent's
interest in preserving peace between the competing factions so that production might go on, unhindered
by extraneous matters." Id. at 373 (emphasis added).
42. Id. at 375. Although the court characterized the post-strike work environment at Boeing as
volatile, it later noted that "labor peace has reigned for years [at Boeing]," thereby potentially under-




46. Id. at 375.
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A Second Circuit case also perpetuates these assumptions. In Midstate
Telephone Corp. v. NLRB,4 7 the employer, a public utility, disciplined em-
ployees for wearing t-shirts bearing the company trademark appearing
cracked in three places and displaying the words "I SURVIVED THE MID-
STATE STRIKE OF 1971-75-79. "48 The Second Circuit found the em-
ployer's actions justified on the ground that the t-shirts might impair the
company's public image and threaten internal discipline.4 9 Again, the
court's rhetoric is instructive. The court noted that the "cracked logo"
"could readily be ... construed" as offensive because, as the Administrative
Law Judge found, it portrayed the company as "crumbling or disintegrat-
ing."50 Thus, the employer had a "legitimate concern" that the t-shirts
would "suggest to the public that the Company was in some way coming
apart."'" Regardless of the accuracy of the message, this characterization
grossly overstates the threat to the employer posed by a t-shirt. In fact, the
Board found that most workers wearing the t-shirts had no contact with the
public.5" Yet according to the court's logic, an employee's section 7 rights
must give way to the employer's desire to present a harmonious facade for
its customers.
The court went further, citing favorably the ALJ's finding that in the
post-strike context, banning the t-shirts was "legitimately motivated in or-
der to maintain -discipline and harmonious employee-management rela-
tions."53 The employees first wore the t-shirts three months after the end of
a 19-week strike.54 Yet, as in Boeing, the Midstate court did not require the
employer to produce evidence that violence or intimidation had occurred in
the post-strike period, but instead gave credence to a company official's
testimony that the t-shirts were meant to "keep ... the wounds [from the
strike] open."55 Moreover, the court reasoned that the t-shirts had the "po-
tential to serve as a 'constant irritant' to management."5 6 Finally, the court
concluded that the employees had only an "ill-defined interest at the rele-
vant time in promoting union solidarity in this manner," an interest that
must give way to the interests of their employer.57
The Midstate decision is remarkable because it indicates just how far
the court will stretch to accommodate employer business justifications for
47. 706 F.2d 401 (2d Cir. 1983).
48. Id. at 402.
49. Id. at 404.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Midstate Tel. Corp., 262 N.L.R.B. 1291, 1291 (1982), enforcement denied in relevant part,
706 F.2d 401 (2d Cir. 1983).
53. Midstate, 706 F.2d at 404.
54. Id. at 402.
55. Id. at 404.
56. Id. (quoting Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 200 N.L.R.B. 667, 670 (1972)).
57. Midstate, 706 F.2d at 404.
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regulating employee speech in the post-strike context. Consider, for exam-
ple, the court's statement that the t-shirts could be an "irritant" to manage-
ment. The NLRA nowhere contemplates that section 7 rights of employees
can be restricted merely because they "irritate" an employer.58 At some
level, almost every form of union organizing is an annoyance to manage-
ment, infringing on its prerogatives to control its workplace in any mannner
it chooses.59 In fact, it is hard to conceive of any activity more "irritating"
to management than a strike, the economic weapon which lies at the heart
of the NLRA.6°
The Second Circuit's dedication to "healing the wounds" of the strike
by suppressing employee expression is equally troubling. The very fact that
the employees chose to wear the t-shirts indicates that the wounds still were
open. Hence, the shirts served a venting function, allowing employees to
express their grievances with their employer in a peaceful fashion.
Ultimately, the Midstate opinion manifests the court's fundamental
doubt about whether the employee expression at issue actually falls within
the scope of section 7. In Midstate, the ALJ found that the employees had
"no legitimate or concerted purpose under section 7 because the strike was
over and the employees' expression of discontent was made in a manner
that 'can only prolong ill feelings and poor labor relations.' ,,61 In contrast,
the Board concluded that the t-shirts were "intended to promote employee
solidarity on a matter of mutual concern to employees. '62 The Second Cir-
cuit, however, refused to decide this issue; instead, the court classified the
employees' section 7 interests as "ill-defined" and reasoned that "even if the
t-shirts were intended to promote employee solidarity," the employer's re-
strictions were legally justifiable.63 This conception profoundly under-
mines the significance of employee expression rights, a significance that
may be particularly acute after a prolonged strike.6' The I-survived-the-
strike t-shirt not only signaled the individual's pride in membership and
58. See 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 157-158.
59. See Branscomb, supra note 2, at 365-66.
60. Perhaps the courts' real objection was to the tone of the t-shirts, which suggested the com-
pany's harsh management of its employees. In a different context, however, the Supreme Court indi-
cated it would allow wide latitude to the tone of employee speech in labor disputes: the "[e]xpression of
... an opinion, even in the most pejorative terms, is protected under federal labor law." Old Dominion
Branch No. 496, Nat'l Ass'n of Letter Carriers v. Austin, 418 U.S. 264, 284 (1974) (holding that federal
labor law preempts state libel law where the state defines statements made during labor disputes as
actionable without applying an actual malice standard; therefore, the use of the term "scab" during a
labor dispute was not libelous).
61. Midstate, 706 F.2d at 403.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. See discussion infra part III.B. at 21-26.
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commitment to group solidarity, but also reflected the continuing strength
of the union.65
The Midstate court's refusal to acknowledge the importance of this
right indicates how precarious the protection of employee expression may
be in the post-strike period. Although Republic Aviation envisioned a
scheme in which employer restrictions on speech would be presumptively
invalid, Boeing and Midstate show how readily the appellate courts6 6 will
accept an employer's assertion that such restrictions are necessary to main-
tain order after a strike. As Boeing and Midstate also demonstrate, how-
ever, the Board is ordinarily more skeptical of such justifications than are
the courts and is thus more likely to demand that an employer bring forth
actual evidence of violence or disruption to justify suppressing employee
expression. Even so, the Board's decisions often rest on a misguided notion
of the "inflammability" of employee passions in the post-strike period.
2. The Board
Reynolds Electrical & Engineering Co.67 exemplifies just how difficult
it can be to mediate conflicts between the employees' right to expression
and the employer's right to maintain order in the workplace. 68 Reynolds
presents particularly appealing facts to justify restrictions on employee
speech. The strike against Reynolds was violent, and the violence contin-
ued in the post-strike workplace. Returning strikers continually harassed
"scabs" by slashing their tires, urinating on their food, and threatening and
verbally abusing them.6 9 A union business agent even told union members
to treat the scabs "with a ten-foot pole, just like they're supervisors."7 °
When the former strikers began wearing buttons showing the word "scab"
65. See Teeter, supra note 19, at 379 ("On the collective level, wearing union insignia enhances
group solidarity, encourages others to seek membership, and testifies to union strength. On the individ-
ual level, wearing insignia permits each worker to express union commitment and demonstrate pride in
membership.").
66. In Manchester Health Ctr. v. NLRB, 861 F.2d 50 (2d Cir. 1988), the Second Circuit again
indicated its commitment to "healing the wounds" caused by a strike by suppressing employee expres-
sion. In that case, the union and the employer, a health facility, agreed, following a bitter and violent
strike, to proscribe discussions of union matters except during non-work time and in non-work areas.
The employer disciplined and ultimately discharged an employee for discussing union matters in work
areas. The court supported this rule: "We believe that the purpose of healing wounds after a bitter strike
and insulating patients from the resultant controversy ... justify restrictions on the rights of employees
to discuss union activities." Id. at 51.
67. 292 N.L.R.B. 947 (1989).
68. The facts of Reynolds are similar, although perhaps more favorable to employer regulation of
employee speech, than those in United Aircraft Corp., 134 N.L.R.B. 1632 (1961). In that case, fighting
and name-calling occurred after the strike and a union presidential candidate threatened that "every
strike-breaker will be hunted down." Consequently, the Board held that an employer's prohibition
against employees' wearing a pin indicating they had honored a nine-week strike was a "reasonable
precautionary measure under the circumstances." Id. at 1635.
69. Reynolds, 292 N.L.R.B. at 948-49.
70. Id. at 953.
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with a diagonal red slash through it, the employer intervened. Although it
did not ban other union insignia, the employer banned the anti-scab buttons
as a threat to discipline and production.7' Consequently, the Board held
that the employer's restriction was a "reasonable and precautionary mea-
sure" and did not violate section 8(a)(3) or (1).72
A more recent Board decision reveals, however, that the approach of
the Reynolds court to post-strike restrictions on employee expression is not
necessarily warranted, even in cases of egregious employee misbehavior.
In Boise Cascade,73 the employer, a paper company that recently had suf-
fered an acrimonious strike, banned the wearing of "derogatory" insignia in
the workplace. Several of its employees began wearing "anti-scab" t-shirts
and sporting stickers in support of a sister local's strike at International
Paper in Jay, Maine. 74 The employer banned these items as contrary to its
prior regulation. But unlike the judge in Reynolds, the judge in Boise de-
manded specific proof linking the banned insignia to threats to discipline or
production, stating that "general, speculative, isolated or conclusionary evi-
dence of potential disruption does not amount to 'special circumstances.' 
75
The judge stressed the fact that employees had worn the shirts for six
months preceding the ban, with no untoward consequences. Hence, the em-
ployer had "had an opportunity to deal with any threats to discipline or
production posed by the post-strike animosity and, more particularly, by the
open use of the banned t-shirts and stickers for the 6 months they had been
worn or displayed at the mill."76
The judge not only demanded actual proof that the banned insignia
would lead to discipline problems; he also rejected the oft-quoted argument
that an employer should not be required to "wait until resentment piled up
71. The AU in Reynolds discussed at length the meaning of the "scab"-with-a-slash buttons:
The parties were in agreement that a word with a slash through it is an international symbol
that means certain conduct is forbidden. Thus, in a park, a picture of a dog with a red slash
through it means no dogs are permitted in that park .... [Tihe "no scabs permitted here"
buttons were not only statements of contempt for the employees who had not participated in
the strike, but also requests that the Company discharge the employees (since the Company
was the only one in a position to deny permission to them to be on the property) and an
attempt to intimidate those employees into quitting.
Reynolds, 292 N.L.R.B. at 950. In adopting such a unilateral interpretation of the no-scab buttons, the
AU failed to weigh properly the important interests served by the buttons. Several former strikers
testified that the buttons were a symbol of solidarity and union pride and a signal to others to join so
there would be no more scabs. The Board did not adopt this part of the ALU's opinion and instead
adopted the alternate rationale based on United Aircraft. Id. at 950-52.
72. See id. at 951-52.
73. 300 N.L.R.B. 80 (1990).
74. Id. at 81. The bumper stickers contained the names of the companies that provided work for
IP during the Jay strike with "diagonal slashes through them, the words 'no way' next to them, and the
words 'scab' and 'strikebreaker' written across the middle of the sticker." A picture of a rat appeared
next to the symbol of one of the companies. The t-shirts also displayed the names of these companies
with diagonal slashes through them and the words "no way" and "strikebreaker." Id.
75. Id. at 82. The Board's decision adopted the opinion of the AU. Id. at 80.
76. Id. at 84.
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and the storm broke before it could suppress the threat of disruption."77
Although this argument may seem a persuasive justification for suppressing
employee expression in the post-strike context, it begs the question of
whether such suppression will actually achieve the desired result. Even
where, as in Reynolds, an employer presents evidence of violence and dis-
ruption in the post-strike workplace, such evidence does not inevitably lead
to the conclusion that the suppression of union insignia or discussion of
union matters is the most effective means to remedy the problem. Instead,
the proper solution is to punish the individuals who actually engage in vio-
lence or disruption in the workplace, rather than those employees who
peacefully wear union insignia or discuss union matters in the workplace.
III
COMPETING VALUES AND MODELS OF WORKPLACE DISCIPLINE:
WHAT IS AT STAKE?
As the preceding discussion indicates, appellate courts must strike a
balance between employer control of the workplace and employee expres-
sion protected by section 7, and striking this balance may be particularly
difficult in the post-strike period. The case law in this area reveals that,
despite section 7's explicit protection of employee expression, implicit as-
sumptions about workplace relations and behavior often tip this balance in
favor of managerial control. Specifically, appellate courts have adopted a
"Tayloristic" or "rational systems" paradigm of workplace relations, a para-
digm that, in the name of productivity and efficiency, gives primacy to em-
ployer control of the workplace and accords only a limited role to employee
"voice.''78 Recent scholarship, however, questions the basic premises of the
Tayloristic paradigm and proposes alternative models of industrial rela-
tions.79 These alternative models suggest that suppressing employee ex-
pression in the post-strike context actually may have the perverse result of
prolonging rather than dispelling hostilities between labor and management.
By adopting an alternative paradigm of workplace relations, courts can bet-
ter fulfill the statutory scheme of section 7.
A. The Tayloristic Model
By tacitly adopting the Tayloristic paradigm, courts tend to favor em-
ployer over employee interests in the aftermath of a strike. According to
77. Compare id. at 81-84 with Caterpillar Tractor Co. v. NLRB, 230 F.2d 357, 359 (7th Cir.
1956); Reynolds Elec. & Eng'g Co., 292 N.L.R.B. 947, 952 (1988); Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 200
N.L.R.B. 667, 671 (1972).
78. See generally RAY MARSHALL & MARC TUCKER, THINKING FOR A LIVING: WORK, SKILLS AND
THE FUTrURE OF THE AMERICAN ECONOMY 3-27 (1992); FREDERICK W. TAYLOR, SCIENTIFIC MANAGE-
MENT (1947).
79. See, generally, Getman & Marshall, supra note 2; BARRY BLUESTONE & IRVING BLUESTONE,
NEGOTIATING THE FUTURE (1992); PAUL WEILER, GOVERNING THE WORKPLACE (1990).
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this theory of workplace relations, the employer's interest in maintaining
order in the post-strike workplace is invariably at odds with the employee's
interest in expression.8" A central tenet of the Tayloristic model is that an
authoritarian and hierarchically structured workplace is the key to optimal
efficiency and that competitiveness thus will be fostered by increasing man-
agerial discretion and reducing labor costs. 8 ' Often called the "rational sys-
tems" model, it emphasizes the "need for specific goals for an organization
and a formalized structure." 2 Decision-making power and responsibility,
or, as Professor Marshall terms them, "the thinking skills," are centralized
in the hands of management.8 3 Management's role, at least in theory, is to
determine the "one best way to perform a task" and to "impose it on work-
ers through detailed rules, instructions, administrators, and supervisors. 84
This model has serious implications for the treatment of workers gen-
erally and the role given employee expression specifically. As Professor
Massaro describes this view: "Employees are viewed as fungible, and feel-
ings among employees are of little significance. 85 Workers are not sup-
posed to think; they are supposed to obey. Employee voice has no
functional role in the workplace.86 In fact, employee input is considered
subversive, threatening the established authority structure. Thus, in effect,
the Tayloristic paradigm stacks the deck in the employer's favor.
87
This model of workplace relations seems to underlie the courts' rea-
soning in cases such as Boeing and Midstate. In the tense atmosphere of the
post-strike period, the employer has a heightened need to maintain order
and discipline. According to the Boeing and Midstate courts, employee ex-
pression, though protected by section 7, serves no positive role in the work-
place. The employer thus has no interest in allowing employees to vent
their grievances because employee expression is a threat to managerial
authority.
In Midstate, for example, the Second Circuit characterized employee
expression as a potential "irritant" to management; 88 likewise, the Boeing
court spoke of employee expression as the "spark" that might kindle the
80. See generally Toni M. Massaro, Significant Silences: Freedom of Speech in the Public Sector
Workplace, 61 S. CAL. L. REv. 1 (1987).
81. See generally Taylor, supra note 78.
82. Massaro, supra note 80, at 53-54 (discussing the Supreme Court's reliance on the "rational
systems" paradigm of workplace relations in extending protection for the speech of public sector
employees).
83. Getman & Marshall, supra note 2, at 1808.
84. Id.
85. Massaro, supra note 80, at 53-54.
86. Id. In essence, the Tayloristic model accords no positive role to employee "voice," regardless
of whether that voice takes the form of protest or of employee input into the production process.
87. The courts' tendency to accord great deference to the need for managerial control is not
unique to the post-strike situation. See generally JAMsS B. ATLESON, VALUES AND ASSUMPTIONS IN
AMERICAN LABOR LAw 91-107 (1983) (discussing courts' deference to managerial prerogatives).
88. Midstate Tel. Corp. v. NLRB, 706 F.2d 401, 404 (2d Cir. 1983).
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"inflammable" passions in the workplace.89 The courts thus have assumed
that employee expression may threaten production and trigger chaos and
disorder. Or, as one commentator has written, "Boeing and its progeny em-
body the belief that workers are Pavlovian creatures that will leap to vio-
lence at the sight of buttons."9 Because the Boeing and Midstate courts
viewed the work environment (and its denizens) as inherently volatile, they
demanded no empirical proof to support employers' assertions that em-
ployee expression threatened to impair order and productivity. Such cate-
gorical assumptions about industrial relations predispose courts to give
short shrift to the section 7 rights of employees in the post-strike context.
B. Competing Models of Industrial Relations
Because these authoritarian assumptions about industrial relations ig-
nore the human complexity of post-strike interactions, however, the courts'
decision to sacrifice employee section 7 rights to the goal of productivity
may be self-defeating. The courts' implicit adoption of the Tayloristic par-
adigm is neither necessary nor desirable, and courts would do well to con-
sider competing organizational theories that are more consonant with
section 7 rights. Competing theories of workplace organization 9 t-theories
that focus on high worker performance and high wages as strategies for
competitiveness-stress the value of worker "voice" as a component of sys-
tem efficiency. These theories of workplace relations take from occupa-
tional sociology the insight that "work skills are not only physical and
intellectual;" they also are "social and interpersonal."92 Unlike the Tayloris-
tic paradigm, these theories recognize that workers "are never merely 'hired
hands' but bring along their heads and hearts."93 Worker motivation and
morale can dramatically affect the productivity of the enterprise. 94 From
this perspective, worker expression is not an inherent threat to productivity;
89. Boeing Airplane Co. v. NLRB, 217 F.2d 369, 375 (9th Cir. 1954).
90. Teeter, supra note 19, at 415.
91. Both the "natural systems" model and the "open systems" model of workplace relations, for
example, recognize the importance of worker behavior as a component of efficiency. For a discussion
of these two theories, see generally W. RICHARD ScoTT, ORGANIZATIONs: RATIONAL, NATURAL AND
OPEN SYsTEMs (1981).
92. Massaro, supra note 80, at 52 (citing WALTER S. NEFF, WORK AND HUMAN BEHAVIOR 70 (3d
ed. 1985)).
93. This formulation comes from the "natural systems model" of labor sociology. W. RICHARD
SCOTr, ORGANIZATIONS: RATIONAL, NATURAL AND OPEN SYSTEMS 83 (1981). This model values
worker participation and "voice" in the organizational structure, since such participation actually may
increase worker effectiveness. Massaro, supra note 80, at 57.
94. See SpEcIAL TASK FORCE TO THE SECRETARY OF HEALTH, EDUCATION AND WELFARE, WORK
IN AMERICA 13 (1973) ("What the workers want most, as more than 100 studies in the past 20 years
show, is to become masters of their immediate environments and to feel that their work and they them-
selves are important.").
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it is essential to productivity. Efficiency therefore is fostered by providing
workers with a mechanism to express and resolve their shared concerns.95
Interviews with workers involved in the International Paper and Cater-
pillar strikes confirm these observations about the effect of worker behavior
on productivity. In both cases, returning strikers experienced alienation,
frustration, anxiety, anger, and even depression.96 No longer were they
proud of the companies for which they worked. Instead, they felt betrayed,
as if their employers had sent them a clear message that they were fungible,
that their labor was unimportant. 97 One writer summed up the effect of the
strike on the attitudes of Caterpillar workers: "Angry that they have spent
years working for a company that does not respect its workers, they just
want their paycheck and to be left alone."98
Emotions generated during an acrimonious strike continue to under-
mine worker motivation-"the extra drive that pushes productivity"99-in
the post-strike period. At IP, for example, alienated workers refused to give
the company the benefit of their knowledge and experience: "They worked
hard, but with little thought about how best to do their jobs.'"'0° One re-
turning Caterpillar striker poignantly expressed his resulting disaffection
with the company: "'Eight hours was forever and I threatened to kill if they
forced me to work overtime. It was that bad and I used to work a lot of
overtime before the strike.""" Not surprisingly, such behavior takes its
toll on productivity, quality and profits. 12
Viewed from this perspective, the employer will have a strong interest
in reducing worker alienation and disaffection in the aftermath of a bitter
strike. On one hand, the employer might seek to accomplish this goal by
suppressing employee expression, presuming that such expression will per-
petuate the hostilities generated by the strike. However, not only does this
approach violate the statutory mandate of section 7; it also undermines the
95. See Cynthia L. Estlund, Economic Rationality and Union Avoidance: Misunderstanding the
National Labor Relations Act, 71 TEX. L. Rav. 921, 956 (1993) (noting that unions may serve as an
institutionalized "voice" for employees); RicHARD B. FREEMAN & JAMES L. MEDOFF, WHAT Do UNIONS
Do? 8-9 (1984) (same).
96. See C. W. Kaha, After the Caterpillar Strike, ST. Louis POST DISPATCH, Aug. 10, 1992, at 3B,
3B (5-star ed.); Getman & Marshall, supra note 2, at 1836-45.
97. It used to be that the Caterpillar worker would feel proud to be a part of the company,
proud of the product and pleased to wear a CAT hat. Because of the actions of the company
during the strike-the hiring of Vance security, the threat to replace workers, the perception
that the company was out to break the union-the workers are no longer proud of the
company.
Kaha, supra note 96, at 3B.
98. Id.
99. Stephen Franklin, No Peace, No Contract a Year After Caterpillar Standoff, CHI. TRIB., Apr.
12, 1993, at 1.
100. Getman & Marshall, supra note 2, at 1840.
101. Id.
102. Getman & Marshall, supra note 2, at 1841-42.
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personal dignity of employees. 103 As one commentator has noted, when an
employer bans employee expression of union sympathies, employees are
forced to "relinquish a fundamental aspect of... personal identity."" Fur-
thermore, this "needless subjugation of individual autonomy can only fuel
feelings of resentment and alienation in the workplace."'' 0 5 In essence, ban-
ning employee expression after a strike adds insult to injury. Rather than
reducing the anger and frustration of workers, banning employee expression
only reinforces their sense of insignificance in the workplace.
As the anecdotal evidence from the IP and the Caterpillar strikes
reveals, banning employee expression in the name of workplace efficiency
after a divisive strike ignores the human dimension of the problem. In fact,
the goal of restoring harmony to the post-strike workplace may better be
served by fostering rather than suppressing employee expression. Discus-
sion of conflicts, or the exercise of "voice" in Professor Hirschman's termi-
nology, plays an important role in helping organizations to resolve
problems and adapt to change." By allowing employees to vent their
grievances, then, employers may be taking the first step toward recognizing
and resolving workplace conflicts.
Indeed, in the context of organizing campaigns, courts explicitly have
acknowledged that labor relations may be heated and that considerable lee-
way must be allowed for emotional "venting."' ' 7 Interviews with returning
strikers suggest that the functional role of "voice" may be especially impor-
tant in the post-strike context.'08 Precisely because emotions run high in
the aftermath of a strike, "voice" can act as a safety valve mechanism to
defuse hostilities. Allowing employees to vent their grievances manifests
respect for their individual autonomy and the importance of their role in the
workplace. More fundamentally, "voice" is a positive alternative to
103. Professor Weiler characterizes the importance of work to the personal identity of workers as
follows: "For the employee work is... a major source of personal identity and satisfaction, of his sense
of self-esteem and accomplishment, and of many of his closest and most enduring relationships." PAUL
WEILER, GOVERNINo THE WORKPLACE 143 (1990).
104. Teeter, supra note 19, at 429.
105. Id. Banning employee expression also ignores its role in enhancing group solidarity, which
may help reduce the alienation workers often feel after a strike. On a more practical note, solidarity is
important in the post-strike period because of the likelihood of a decertification election following a
divisive strike.
106. ALBERT O. HmscmAN, Exrr, VOICE, AND LOYALTY 36-43 (1970).
107. See, e.g., Linn v. United Plant Guard Workers of Am., Local 114, 383 U.S. 53 (1966) (holding
that state tort actions for libel are available in the course of a labor dispute only when the statements
were made with malice and caused damage to the complainant); Old Dominion Branch No. 496, Na-
tional Ass'n of Letter Carders v. Austin, 418 U.S. 264 (1974) (holding that a union's publication of a
"list of scabs" is protected under federal labor law and is thus not actionable under state libel law). But
see Misericordia Hosp. Medical Ctr. v. NLRB, 623 F.2d 808, 814 n.8 (2d Cir. 1980) (rejecting the
argument that expression during an organizing campaign deserves greater section 7 protection than other
types of section 7 activity).
108. See supra notes 96-98 and accompanying text.
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"exit,"" whether literal or figurative. From this perspective, therefore, the
interests of employees in venting their grievances and in expressing their
union solidarity are not necessarily inconsistent.
This theory does not imply that fostering employee expression is al-
ways the best means of resolving conflict in the post-strike period. Un-
doubtedly, a tension exists between the need to maintain discipline and the
employees' need to voice their grievances in the tense atmosphere often
prevailing after the strike. As Hirschman has noted, "voice" can "be
overdone: the discontented... members [of an organization] could become
so harassing that their protests would at some point hinder rather than help"
the operation of the organization." 0 Perhaps the best way to restore nor-
malcy to the post-strike workplace would be to establish a formal procedure
for employee expression and grievance resolution, with the union acting as
intermediary. Short of this solution, however, courts must recognize the
importance of section 7 expression rights in the aftermath of a strike, espe-
cially the positive role employee "voice" may play in restoring calm to the
workplace.
IV
CONCLUSION: PRACTICAL AND PHILOSOPHICAL SUGGESTIONS
To a large extent, the role one assigns to employee expression in the
workplace, as well as the extent to which one believes in the venting func-
tion of speech, are value judgments. Ideally, employers will recognize that
it is not inimical to their interest to permit employee expression in the post-
strike period, even though such expression may be, in the term used by the
Midstate court, an "irritant." Many employers, however, still will choose to
act on the premise that increased managerial control is the best means of
restoring order to the post-strike workplace. Even where employers seek to
suppress employee expression, however, the Board and the courts should
demand a threshold showing of imminent threat to discipline or production
in order to satisfy Republic Aviation's special exception test. Such a stan-
dard is necessary to fulfill section 7's guarantee of protection for employee
self-organization rights.
In essence, this article proposes that courts adopt an alternative ap-
proach-both practically and philosophically-to restoring order to the
post-strike workplace. As a practical matter, the Board and the courts
should refuse to suppress employee expression unless the employer presents
specific proof linking the banned expression to threats to discipline or pro-
duction. Courts should refuse to accept ad hoc employer justifications
109. HiRscHMAN, supra note 106, at 36-37. Workers figuratively "exit" when they perform their
work but, due to demoralizing effects of the strike, do not give their employer the benefit of their
knowledge and experience.
110. Id. at 31.
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based on a speculative connection between expression and chaos in the
workplace. Furthermore, courts should assess whether suppressing em-
ployee expression actually will achieve the desired result. In many cases,
punishing the actual conduct of individuals who engage in disruptive be-
havior will be more effective in maintaining discipline than will blanket
suppression of employee expression.
As a philosophical matter, courts should reexamine their assumptions
about workplace relations. Since the courts' choice of organizational theory
about workplace relations is, in essence, a value choice, it is reasonable to
expect courts to adopt the theory that best fosters the statutory purposes of
section 7-protecting employee speech meant to enhance union solidar-
ity-in the post-strike workplace. Although the Tayloristic model of work-
place relations assigns no positive role to employee expression in the
workplace, alternative models of workplace relations recognize that em-
ployee expression is a key component of organizational efficiency. Anec-
dotal evidence supports the theory that the problem of post-strike
expression is a human problem; consequently, in striking a balance between
labor and management, courts must remember that returning strikers are, as
one writer put it, "people with stories to tell." '
The story of Janet Kolzow illustrates just how important section 7
rights can be to the personal dignity of employees in the aftermath of a
strike. 12 Kolzow, a "soft-spoken, gray-haired grandmother who voted for
Ronald Reagan in 1980," worked for Caterpillar for twenty-seven years.
One morning shortly after the Caterpillar strike, Kolzow decided to take a
stand by wearing a t-shirt to work bearing the words "Permanently Replace
Fites." Fites was Caterpillar's CEO and the architect of its labor policy
during the five-and-a-half month strike in Peoria, Illinois. When Kolzow's
foreman asked her to remove the shirt, she refused, citing an NLRB ruling
about the union's rights. In response, Kolzow's manager indefinitely sus-
pended her. A short while later, sitting at the offices of UAW Local 145,
Kolzow expressed her feelings this way: "I decided this is what I was going
to do. I decided there are some things in your life you have to stand up for
and say, 'Enough is enough."'1 13 Workers like Kolzow deserve a right to
vent their frustration. Courts should not lightly sacrifice employees' section
7 rights and their personal dignity in the purported interest of productivity.
111. Kaha, supra note 96, at 3B.
112. See Franklin, supra note 99, at 1.
113. Id. at 1.
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